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When,	to	silent	sessions	devoted	to	brain	thought,	
We	summon	up	formulations	from	endeavours	past,		
And	sigh	the	lack	of	many	a	principle	that	we	sought,		
Because	those	principles	were,	in	our	mind,	mis-cast,		
Lo,	for	all	priors	should	not	be	tied	in	a	single	Bayesian	knot	
For	biological	and	artefactual	priors	each	have	a	separate	slot	
	A	(posterior)	Bayesian-Laplacian	adaptation	from	Shakespeare's	Sonnets				Abstract		
We	 discuss	 here	 what	 we	 feel	 could	 be	 an	 improvement	 in	 future	
discussions	 of	 the	 brain	 acting	 as	 a	 Bayesian-Laplacian	 system,	 by	
distinguishing	 between	 two	 classes	 of	 priors	 on	 which	 the	 brain’s	
inferential	systems	operate.	In	one	category	are	biological	priors	(β	priors)	
and	 in	 the	 other	 artefactual	 ones	 (α	 priors).	 We	 argue	 that	 β	 priors	 are	
inherited	or	acquired	very	rapidly	after	birth	and	are	much	more	resistant	
to	varying	experiences	than	α	priors	which,	being	continuously	acquired	at	
various	 stages	 throughout	post-natal	 life,	 are	much	more	accommodating	
of,	 and	 hospitable	 to,	 new	 experiences.	 Consequently,	 the	 posteriors	
generated	 from	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 priors	 are	 likewise	 different,	 being	more	
constrained	(i.e.,	precise)	for	β	than	for	α	priors.	
	
	
I.	Introduction:	We	outline	below	an	approach	to	the	Bayesian-Laplacian	system	as	applied	to	brain	studies,	which	differs	somewhat	from	previous	approaches.	Our	hope	is	that	it	may	constitute	a	useful	contribution	to	efforts	in	neuroscience	that	address	the	extent	to	which	the	brain	uses	what	may	be	called	Bayesian-Laplacian	inferential	operations.		Our	approach	is	inspired	by	such	knowledge	of	perception	that	we	have	and	by	past	discussions	in	philosophy,	colour	vision,	and	neuroesthetics.		The	Bayesian-Laplacian	approach	is	an	evolving	one	(Laplace,	1812)(Fienberg,	2006),	with	physiological	and	philosophical	foundations	(Helmholtz,	1867)3																																																									1	Email:	s.zeki@ucl.ac.uk	2	Email:	yibing.chen@yale.edu	3	In	the	article,	Helmholtz	described	a	view	which	he	called	the	intuition	theory	(nativistische	Theorie),	that	“it	is	necessary	to	assume	a	system	of	innate	
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(Bovens	&	Hartmann,	2005)	(Talbott,	2008)(Rosenkrantz,	1977)	(Gelman	&	Shalizi,	2013)	and	probabilistic,	statistical,	and	computational	implications	(Good	et	al.,	1966)	(Bernardo	&	Smith,	2008)	(Gelman	et	al.,	2004).	It	summarizes	a	fundamental	inferential	principle	in	which	probabilities	of	occurrence	of	events	are	based	on	priors	and	lead	to	posteriors,	which	in	turn	modify	inference	(Kersten	et	al.,	2004,	Knill	and	Pouget,	2004,	Yuille	and	Kersten,	2006,	Clark,	2013)	and	behaviour	(Friston	et	al.,	2011,	Botvinick	and	Toussaint,	2012,	Friston	et	al.,	2015).			It	is	an	approach	wherein	inferential	statements,	e.g.	that	the	currency	of	an	unstable	country	will	change	in	value,	can	be	formulated	by	a	simple	probability	law	based	upon	the	current	state	of	that	country	and	historical	examples	of	currency	fluctuations	with	unstable	governments.			Fundamental	to	this	operation	is	belief,	which	is	intimately	linked	to	priors.	The	brain	must	continually	update	the	hypotheses	that	it	entertains	about	the	world	in	light	of	the	information	reaching	it	and	against	its	current	beliefs.	Our	approach	leads	us	to	enquire	into	different	categories	of	Bayesian-Laplacian	priors,	the	beliefs	that	they	are	based	on	and	that	they	give	rise	to,	and	the	role	that	these	priors	and	the	beliefs	attached	to	them	play	in	shaping	the	brain’s	inferential	systems.	Our	discussion	is	not	exhaustive;	rather,	we	hope	that	it	lays	down	a	basic	framework	for	an	alternative	approach	through	which	to	consider	the	operations	of	the	brain	in	a	Bayesian-Laplacian	context.	The	major	departure	in	our	approach	is	a	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	priors,	Biological	(β	priors)	and	Artefactual	(α	
priors).	The	former	are	regulated	largely	by	inherited	brain	concepts	while	the	latter	are	subject	to	acquired	(synthetic)	brain	concepts	(Zeki,	2009).	This	distinction	leads	us	to	propose	further	that	the	beliefs	attached	to	the	two	categories	of	priors	must	also	be	distinguished	according	to	category.			As	a	preamble,	it	is	useful	to	outline	what	we	believe	are	some	important	principles	governing	the	organization	of	the	brain:		1. One	of	the	primordial	functions	of	the	brain	is	the	acquisition	of	knowledge.		2. This	knowledge	is	acquired	to	take	action,	but	the	knowledge	comes	first.		3.		The	brain	cannot	know	in	advance	what	conditions	or	stimuli	it	will	experience	or	has	to	acquire	knowledge	of.		It	is	therefore	organized	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	it	to	sample	epistemically	as	many	experiences	as	possible;	it																																																																																																																																																															apperceptions	that	are	not	based	on	experience,	especially	with	respect	to	space-raltions.	In	the	same	article,	he	also	stated	that	“the	judgment	of	the	sense	may	be	modified	by	experience	and	by	training	derived	under	various	circumstances,	and	may	be	adapted	to	the	new	conditions.”	He	thus	came	close	to	distinguishing	between	the	two	sets	of	priors	that	we	discuss	here,	although	his	discussion	remains	vague	and	does	not	give	or	define	either	a	general	or	specific	framework	for	distinguishing	between	priors	(a	term	he	did	not	use)	or	provide	a	specific	framework	of	how	the	“unconscious	inference”	operates	in,	for	example,	colour	vision,	as	we	do	here.				
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subjects	all	inputs	to	constructive	explanation	or	concepts,	which	may	be	regarded	as	the	foundation	of	the	knowledge	acquiring	system	of	the	brain,	because	“perceptions	without	concepts	are	blind”	(Kant,	1787).	These	concepts	are	of	two	kinds,	inherited	and	acquired	(Zeki,	2009).			4. Inherited	(biological)	priors	are	the	result	of	concepts	that	we	are	born	with;	they	are	resistant	to	change	even	with	extensive	experience	and	hence	must	be	distinguished	from	artefactual	concepts.			5. Acquired	(artefactual	or	synthetic	concepts)	priors	depend	upon	concepts	which	are	formulated	postnatally,	and	which	are	modified	by	experience	throughout	life;	they	are	less	constrained	than	biological	concepts.			6. We	define	the	term	“concept”	separately	for	biologically	inherited	concepts	and	acquired,	artefactual,	ones.	The	former	may	be	defined	as	an	inherited	abstract	“idea”	linked	to	a	process	that	is	applied	indifferently	to	incoming	signals	to	generate	priors.	In	colour	vision,	this	would	be	the	biologically	inherited	concept	of	ratio-taking,	which	is	applied	to	incoming	chromatic	visual	signals	and	results	in	a	colour	category	which	constitutes	the	posterior	and	the	prior	(see	Figure	1).	It	therefore	constitutes	a	generative	model	which	generates	sensory	consequences	(colour)	from	causes.	“Colour	[category]”	in	the	words	of	Edwin	Land,	“is	always	a	consequence,	never	a	cause”	(Land,	1985).		7. An	artefactual	concept,	for	example	that	of	a	house,	conforms	more	closely	to	the	dictionary	definition	of	“a	generic	idea	generalized	from	particular	instances”.	Thus	the	idea	of	a	“house”	is	abstract	and	generated	from	viewing	many	houses;	the	concept	continues	to	grow	with	new	experiences.	If	the	brain	acquires	a	generative	model	of	how	a	significant	configuration	of	stimuli	corresponding	to	actual	houses	generate	the	perception	of	a	house,	it	is	in	a	position	to	recognize	these	stimuli	as	corresponding	to	its	previous	experience	of	houses.			8. Hence,	in	the	Bayesian-Laplacian	context,	biological	priors	are	much	more	precise	and	intransigent	than	artefactual	ones,	even	though	both	can	lead	to	almost	limitless	posteriors.	Therefore,	the	beliefs	that	are	attached	to	biological	priors	are	more	widely	shared	(i.e.,	conserved	over	conspecifics),	more	independent	of	culture	and	learning	and	also	less	yielding	to	experience	than	artefactual	priors.		
Historical	Note:	In	1763,	Richard	Price	published	an	edited	article	in	The	
Philosophical	Transactions	of	the	Royal	Society	(which	at	that	time	had	not	been,	interestingly	from	the	point	of	view	of	this	article,	divided	into	two	sections,	representing	the	biological	and	physical	sciences).	The	article	was	by	the	Reverend	Thomas	Bayes	and	entitled	An	essay	towards	solving	a	Problem	in	the	
Doctrine	of	Chances.	Bayes	had	died	in	1761,	and	his	edited	paper	was	thus	published	posthumously.	It	was	discovered	by	the	influential	French	scientist	Pierre-Simon	Laplace	who	discussed	it	in	a	treatise	entitled	Théorie	analytique	
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des	probabilitiés	(Laplace,	1812)	and	formulated	the	expression	now	generally	associated	with	Bayes’	hypothesis:			 𝐻𝒞 𝐸 ∝ 𝐸 𝐻𝒞 [𝐻𝒞]	[See	below;	the	equation	in	the	context	of	colour	vision,	which	we	discuss	below,	means	that	 𝐻𝒞 𝐸 ,	the	posterior	(percept)	of	hue	H	of	a	colour	category	𝒞	(where	examples	of	𝒞	can	be	green,	red,	and	blue),	will	depend	upon	the	prior	which	has	a	belief	attached	to	it,	as	well	as	the	experiment	(experience)	conducted,	[𝐸|𝐻𝒞];  the posterior thus produced	(hue)	can	then	itself	act	as	a	prior	through	further	experimentation,	 𝐻𝒞 𝐸 → [𝐻𝒞],	resulting	in	further	posteriors	which	can	generate	further	priors	(see	also	Figures	1	and	2).	This	is	known	as	Bayesian	belief	updating	and	is	at	the	heart	of	Bayesian-Laplacian	evidence	accumulation.	As	an	extreme	example	of	a	𝛽	prior,	we	have		 𝐻𝒞!|𝐸 ∝ [𝒞]		 𝒞 𝐸 ∝ [𝑅]		where	 𝐻𝒞!|𝐸 ,	the	posterior	(percept)	of	initial	hue	𝐻𝒞!,	depends	only	upon	the	prior	𝒞	(colour	category),	and	hence	is	independent	of	E	(experiment);	and	𝒞 𝐸 ,	the	posterior	(percept)	of	colour	category,	depends	only	upon	[𝑅],	the	ratio-taking	scheme,	and	is	independent	of	any	experiment.	Further	mathematical	proofs	are	given	in	the	Supplementary	Materials.]			By	speaking	only	of	the	Bayesian	hypothesis	we,	by	implication,	fail	to	credit	Laplace	with	the	very	considerable	contribution	that	he	made	in	establishing	the	generality	of	the	hypothesis	originally	formulated	by	Bayes.	We	therefore	think	it	right	to	credit	both	with	this	approach,	by	referring	to	the	Bayesian-Laplacian	formulation	(Pouget	et	al.,	2013).		
		
Figure	1:	A	schematic	representation	of	the	relationship	of	the	ratio-taking	
process	(R)	to	the	generation	of	the	experience	of	colour	(C)	as	a	posterior.	The	
posterior	thus	generated	can	act	as	a	prior	for	generating	another	posterior	(H)	
through	experimentation	(E);	this	latter	posterior	(H)	differs	in	the	shade	of	colour	
(hue)	from	C.	Although	the	ratio	taking	process	R	can	be	thought	of	as	the	
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precursor	and	therefore	the	prior	to	C,	making	C	into	a	posterior,	in	practice	in	this	
case,	R	is	equivalent	to	C	because	the	process	is	independent	of	any	experiment	(for	
further	details	see	text).				
II.	The	need	for	distinguishing	biological	from	non-biological	priors	In	theory,	one	could	consider	all	priors	under	a	single	category	which,	subject	to	experiments	or	experience,	will	produce	posteriors,	as	in	fact	previous	discussions	of	the	Bayesian-Laplacian	brain	have	done	(Dayan	et	al.,	1995)	(Rao	&	Ballard,	1999)	(Lee	&	Mumford,	2003)	(Kersten	et	al.,	2004)(Knill	&	Pouget,	2004)	(Yuille	&	Kersten,	2006)	(Friston	et	al.,	2011)	(Botvinick	&	Toussaint,	2012)	(Clark,	2013)	(Pouget	et	al.,	2013)	(Friston	et	al.,	2015).	In	practice,	the	distinction	between	the	two	sets	of	priors	is	significant	enough	for	experience	to	operate	on	the	two	categories	of	priors	in	different	ways;	the	scope	of	experience	to	modify	is	more	limited	for	β priors	and	the	beliefs	attached	to	them	than	for	α	
priors;	consequently,	the	beliefs	attached	to	the	β priors,	and	the	inferences	drawn	from	them,	are	also	more	biologically	constrained	than	the	ones	attached	to	α	priors.			The	classification	of	priors	into	two	broad	categories	proposed	here	is	based	in	part		on	the	Kantian	system	and	in	part	upon	our	modification	of	it	(Zeki,	2009).	Kant	wrote	in	The	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	(Kant,	1781)	that,	“perceptions	without	concepts	are	blind”,	arguing	that	all	inputs	into	the	mind	(in	our	case	the	brain)	must	be	somehow	organized	by	being	interfaced	through	concepts.	In	The	
Critique	of	Judgment,	he	nevertheless	proposed	that	some	sensory	inputs	are	not	interfaced	through	concepts;	among	these	were	signals	from	objects	that	could	be	categorized	as	beautiful,	as	opposed	to	those	which	had	a	utilitarian	value.	The	former	were	“purposeful	without	a	purpose”	and	the	perceiver	usually	supposed	(believed)	the	operation	of	a	universal	belief	through	which	what	s/he	had	perceived	to	be	beautiful	would	also	be	perceived	to	be	beautiful	by	others.	We	differ	from	this	classification	by	supposing	that	all	percepts,	even	those	pertaining	to	beauty,	are	interfaced	through	concepts	but	we	distinguish	percepts	that	are	grounded	in	inherited	β	priors	from	the	post-natally	acquired	a	
priors	,	which	are	acquired	postnatally	(Zeki,	2009).	There	is	good	reason	to	suppose	that	the	inherited	priors,	which	make	(Bayesian	and	Laplacian)	sense	of	the	sensory	inputs	into	our	brains	are	much	more	similar	between	humans	and	also	far	less	dependent	upon	culture	and	learning	than	the	acquired	ones	.	Hence	one	cardinal	distinction	between	the	two	sets	of	priors	is	that	an	individual	can	reasonably	suppose	that	a	biological	prior,	such	as	colour,	is	an	experience	that	s/he	shares	with	the	great	majority	of	other	individuals,	regardless	of	race	or	culture,	a	characteristic	not	shared	by	the	artefactual	priors	(e.g.	appreciation	of	sushi,	or	the	beauty	of	a	temple	or	a	cathedral).		This	distinction	is	not	commonly	made	and	there	is	therefore	no	general	agreement	as	to	what	disambiguates	biological	and	artefactual	priors.	There	are	probably	other	attributes	that	fall	into	the	biological	category,	for	example	that	of	motion,	but	we	do	not	discuss	these	extensively.	Rather,	we	give	examples	of	what	most	would	agree	fall	into	different	categories	–	colour	and	faces	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	many	artefacts	such	as	buildings	or	cars	on	the	other.	Other	
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beliefs,	quite	distinct	from	objects,	also	fall	into	the	artefactual	category;	for	example,	the	supposition	that	a	government	with	a	hardline	policy	on	health	may,	if	elected,	lead	to	a	rapid	change	in	the	value	of	companies	producing	medicines.	Much	of	the	distinction	that	we	make	is	based	on	common	human	experience.	Therefore,	although	there	may	not	be	common	agreement	on	the	ontology	of	biological	and	artifactual	priors,	their	phenomenology	speaks	to	a	clear	qualitative	distinction.	We	are	effectively	claiming	that	biological	priors	–	that	are	conserved	over	generations	and	cultures	–	have	a	greater	precision	than	the	more	accommodating	(empirical,	artefactual)	priors	we	call	on	to	assimilate	experience	that	is	unique	to	our	time	and	place.		Our	hope	is	that	the	differentiation	we	thus	make	will	be	a	stimulus	for	further	discussion	on	how	the	brain	handles	these	two	different	categories.			We	address	the	distinction	between	biological	and	artifactual	priors	in	terms	of	visual	perception,	about	which	relatively	more	is	known	and	with	which	we	are	better	acquainted.	We	give	two	examples,	among	many,	of	β	priors,	those	belonging	to	colour	and	face	perception.				
III.	Colour	vision:		
III	A:	Colour	as	a	β prior	generated	from	an	inherited	brain	ratio-taking	
concept	Colour	represents	perhaps	the	most	extreme	form	of	a	β	prior	which	is	the	result	of	an	inherited	prior	concept,	that	of	ratio-taking,	which	leads	to	constant	colour	categories	(see	below).	Colour	is	an	experience,	which	we	refer	to	as	its	β prior	and	from	which	hues	may	be	generated	which,	though	belonging	to	the	same	colour	category,	differ	in	appearance	(in	shade	of	colour).	These	hues	become	posteriors	and	act	also	as	new	priors	from	which	further	hues	(posteriors)	can	be	generated	through	experiments	and	experience.		Colour	categories	and	hues	are	also	biological	signalling	mechanisms	allowing	the	rapid	identification	of	objects,	biological	or	otherwise,	by	one	of	their	characteristics.		If	the	colour	of	an	object	or	surface	were	to	change	with	every	change	in	the	illuminant	in	which	it	is	viewed,	then	colour	would	no	longer	be	a	useful	biological	signalling	mechanism,	because	the	object	can	no	longer	be	identified	by	its	colour	alone.	To	make	of	colours	an	autonomous	identifying	mechanism,	they	must	be	stabilized	
and	be	immune,	as	far	as	possible,	from	the	de-stabilizing	effect	of	a	change	when	
the	wavelength	composition	of	the	illuminant	in	which	objects	and	surfaces	are	
viewed	changes.	Physiologically,	the	brain	undertakes	a	ratio-taking	operation	to	render	colours	constant,	and	hence	stabilize	the	world.	Evidence	shows	that	there	are	specific	brain	pathways	and	a	specific	visual	area,	area	V4	and	the	associated	V4a,	that	are	crucial	for	colour	perception(Zeki,	1973)(Zeki,	Watson,	&	Lueck,	1991)(Bartels	&	Zeki,	2000),	damage	to	which	leads	to	the	syndrome	of	cerebral	achromatopsia	(Meadows,	1974)(Zeki,	1990).	It	is	important	to	emphasize	that	V4	not	only	responds	specifically	to	categories	of	colour	but	also	to	hues,	or	shades	of	colour	(Zeki,	1980)(Stoughton	&	Conway,	2008)	(Brouwer	&	Heeger,	2013)	and	that	the	representation	of	colour	within	V4	can	be	independent	of	form	(Zeki,	1983)(Lafer-Sousa,	R,	Conway,	BR,	Kanwisheer,	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
2016).	It	is	therefore	likely	that	area	V4	is	pivotal	to	these	operations	(Bartels	&	Zeki,	2000),	which	is	not	to	say	that	it	acts	in	isolation;	it	does	so	in	co-operation	with	the	areas	it	receives	signals	from	and	projects	to,	together	with	the	reciprocal	connections	between	these	areas.	Colour	is	thus	an	inherited	prior	which	is	severely	constrained	even	though,	paradoxically,	it	also	allows	an	almost	unlimited	variety	of	chromatic	experiences	and	therefore	posteriors	(in	terms	of	hue	-	see	below).		
III	B.	The	brain’s	ratio-taking	system	for	generating	constant	colour	
categories:	Colour	is	a	brain	construct	(Zeki,	1984),		which	is	on	the	one	hand	a	prior	for	generating	hues	and	on	the	other	a	posterior	belief,	the	product	of	an	operation	based	on	an	inherited	brain	concept,	that	of	ratio-taking;	that	operation	compares	the	wavelength	composition	of	light	reflected	from	one	surface	with	that	reflected	from	surrounding	surfaces,	thus	providing	a	ratio	for	light	of	every	waveband	reflected	from	a	viewed	surface	and	from	its	surrounds(Land,	1974)	(Land,	1986)	(Land	&	McCann,	1971)(Zeki,	1984).		Note	that	we	can	refer	to	colour	as	a	posterior,	i.e.	the	product	of	an	operation,	that	involves	ratio-taking.	However,	we	have	shown	that,	using	the	argument	presented	here	and	the	mathematical	proof	given	in	Equation	(1)	of	the	supplementary	materials,		this	process	is	independent	from	any	experiment;	namely,	a	colour	category	is	deterministic	of	(only	dependent	upon)	the	ratio-taking	operation.	Therefore,	in	essence,	the	colour	category	and	the	ratio-taking	operation	are	equivalent.	Hence	within	a	Bayesian-Laplacian	framework,	the	ratio-taking	operation	and	the	colour	category	constitute	the	prior	and	posterior,	respectively	(see	Figure	1).				The	ratios	thus	produced	never	change	(see	Figure	1)	–	they	constitute			fundamental	invariants	in	a	world	composed	of	colourful	objects.	It	is	useful	to	discuss	briefly	here	why	this	should	be	so	in	the	context	of	what	the	constants	in	nature	are,	with	respect	to	how	these	constants	generate	constant	colour	categories.			
	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
	Figure	2:	The	Bayesian	brain	procedures	for	colour	vision.	R	refers	to	the	ratio	
taking	scheme	which	leads	to	our	perception	of	the	colour	category	C,	which	acts	as	
the	biological	prior	for	hue	(H).	When	the	wavelength	composition	of	the	
illuminant	changes	(as	shown	to	the	right),	the	colour	category	C	remains	the	same	
but	the	hue	changes	to	H2.		Note	that	that	the	illuminant	changes	at	t0,	leading	to	
the	same	colour	category	C	and	the	new	hue	H2	at	t1.	For	details,	see	text	and	for	
proof	of	the	equations	see	supplementary	material.		The	unvarying	property	of	surfaces	in	terms	of	colour	vision	is	their	reflectance,	namely	the	amount	of	light	of	any	given	waveband	–	in	percentage	terms	–	that	a	surface	reflects	in	relation	to	the	light	incident	on	it.	For	a	given	surface,	this	percentage	never	changes.	Hence,	one	finds	that	the	ratio	of	light	of	any	waveband	reflected	from	a	given	surface	and	from	its	surrounds	also	never	changes,	regardless	of	the	variation	in	the	amount	of	light	reflected	from	an	object.	If	the	intensity	of	light	of	any	given	waveband	reflected	from	a	surface	is	increased,	the	intensity	of	light	of	the	same	waveband	coming	from	the	surrounds	also	increases,	and	the	ratio	thus	remains	the	same.	By	extension,	the	ratios	of	light	of	all	wavebands	reflected	from	a	surface	and	from	its	surrounds	also	never	change.			Take	as	an	example	a	green	surface	which	forms	part	of	multicoloured	(natural)	scene	as	in	Land’s	colour	Mondrians,	and	thus	surrounded	with	many	patches	of	other	colours,	with	no	patch	being	surrounded	by	another	patch	of	a	single	colour	(Figure	1	shows	a	much	simplified	version).	Let	us	suppose	that	the	green	patch	(g)	reflects	x	per	cent	of	the	long-wave	(red)	light,	l,		incident	on	it,	y	percent	of	the	middle	wave	(green)	light,	m,		(green)		and	z	percent	of	the	short-wave	(blue)	light,	s,		incident	on	it.	The	surrounds,	having	a	higher	efficiency	for	reflecting	long-wave	light,	will	always	reflect	more	and	there	will	be	a	constant	ratio	in	the	amount	of	red	light	reflected	from	the	green	surface	and	from	its	surrounds.	Let	us	call	this	ratio	𝑔!The	surrounds	will	have	a	lower	efficiency	for	reflecting	green	light	and	hence	there	will	be	another	ratio	for	the	amount	of	green	light	(𝑔!)	reflected	from	it	and	from	the	surrounds,	and	a	third	ratio	for	the	amount	of	blue	light	𝑔! 4.	When	the	same	natural	scene	is	viewed	in	light	of	a	different	wavelength	composition,	the	amount	of	light	of	different	wavelengths	reflected	from	a	surface	and	from	its	surrounds	will	change,	often	significantly	(as,	for	example,	when	a	scene	is	viewed	successively	in	tungsten	light,	in	fluorescent	light	or	in	sunlight)	but	the	ratios	in	the	amount	of	light	of	different	wavebands	reflected	from	the	centre	and	from	the	surrounds	remain	the	same.	Formally,	let	us	consider	the	green	patch	viewed	under	two	different	illuminants,	where	the	first	one	has	𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	amounts	of	long,	middle,	and	short	wave	light	reflected	from	the	green	patch,	and	the	second	one	has	𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and																																																									4	For	brevity,	we	restrict	ourselves	to	long,	middle	and	short-wave	light,	without	giving	the	peak	values	along	the	spectrum;	in	practice,	and	under	natural	viewing	conditions,	a	surface	will	reflect	light	of	many	wavelengths,	but	there	will	be	a	(constant)	ratio	for	light	of	any	wavelength	reflected	from	the	centre	and	surrounds.		
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𝑔!!  reflected from it.	The	first	illuminant	results		in		(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	)	and	the	second	in	(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	)	ratios	of	long-,	middle-,	and	short-	wave	light	reflected	from	the	green	patch		and	from	its	surrounds,	respectively.	Then,	mathematically,	we	have:		 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"#$ ≔  !!!!!!  ≡ 𝑥 ≡  !!!!!!	;		𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"#$%! ≔  !!!!!!  ≡ 𝑦 ≡  !!!!!!	;		𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!!!"# ≔  𝑔!!𝑔!!  ≡ 𝑧 ≡  𝑔!!𝑔!! 		where	the	ratios	𝑥,𝑦,	and	𝑧	remain	the	same,	regardless	of	the	precise	wavelength-energy	composition	of	the	light	reflected	from	the	green	patch	and	from	its	surrounds.		It	is	through	such	a	that	the	brain	builds	constant	colour	categories.	These	constant	colours	constitute	the	𝛽	priors;	namely,	the	prior	beliefs	that	sensations	are	caused	by	coloured	objects	in	the	particular	(ratio	preserving)	fashion	described	above.	This	belief	is	a	classic	example	of	Kant’s	statement	in	his	
Prologemena	(Kant,	1783)	that	“The	Mind	[brain]	does	not	derive	its	laws	(a	
priori)	from	nature	but	prescribes	them	to	her”.		The	brain	likely	uses	such	a	ratio	taking-system,	based	on	the	above	constants,	to	construct	constant	colour	categories,	which	constitute	both	the	experience	and	posterior	beliefs	(the	two	are	here	interchangeable,	see	above).	There	is	no	physical	law	that	dictates	that	such	ratios	should	be	taken;	it	is	instead	an	inherited	brain	law	and,	given	the	widespread	use	of	colour	constancy	in	the	animal	kingdom,	we	make	the	assumption	that	similar	mechanisms,	or	very	nearly	so,	are	used	in	species	as	far	apart	as	the	goldfish	(Ingle,	1985)	and	the	human	(Land,	1974).			No	amount	of	visual	experience	can	modify	the	colour	categories	(β	priors);	in	fact	they	cannot	even	be	modified	by	higher	cognitive	knowledge.	For	example,	green	leaves	reflect	more	green	than	red	light	at	noon	and	more	red	light	than	green	at	dawn	and	at	dusk;	but	they	are	always	perceived	as	green,	even	in	the	face	of	knowledge	that	they	are	reflecting	more	red	light	under	certain	conditions.	Hence	the	β	priors	in	colour	are	extremely	stable	and	un-modifiable	with	experience.	Technically,	they	are	endowed	with	precision.	Priors	exert	a	more	constrained	effect	over	posteriors	when	they	are	more	precise,	as	in	biological	priors.	We	use	precision	here	in	a	technical	fashion	to	denote	the	confidence	afforded	to	priors;	precision	is	the	inverse	dispersion	or	uncertainty	encoded	by	a	probability	distribution	(e.g.,	the	variance	of	a	Gaussian	distribution).	We	define	precision	as	1/variance.	In	normal	colour	vision,	given	the	B	prior,	the	variance	is	very	close	to	0	and	the	precision	therefore	approaches	an	infinite	value.								
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III	C.	The	experience	(experiment)	with	(constant)	colours	This	does	not	mean	to	say	that	the	shade	or	hue	of	the	green	patch	remains	constant.	The	hue	will	change	(a)	with	every	change	in	wavelength	composition	and	(b)	can	be	much	influenced	by	the	surrounds.	Thus,	if	the	green	surface	is	reflecting	more	middle	wave	light	than	long	and	short	wave	light,	it	will	appear	a	lighter	green	than	when	it	is	reflecting	more	long-wave	than	middle	or	short	wave	light,	when	it	will	appear	a	darker	green	(Figure	1,	right).	Similarly,	through	the	process	of	colour	induction,	the	saturation	of	the	green	surface	can	be	enhanced	by	surrounding	it	with	red	patches	exclusively.	In	brief,	the	constant	colour	category	(green)	constitutes	the	primal	experience	of	colour	(β	
prior),	while	the	hue	constitutes	the	posterior	derived	from	it;	the	direction	in	which	the	posterior	(hue)	changes	can	be	predicted	with	high	accuracy	through	experience	(see	below)	and	it	is	indeed	this	knowledge	gained	through	experience	and	experimentation	that	artists	use	constantly.	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	cortical	response	to	colour	in	pre-linguistic	infants	(5-7	months)	measured	by	near	infra-red	spectroscopy	indicates	that	there	is	a	significant	increase	in	activity	in	occipito-temporal	regions	(presumably	including	area	V4)	with	between-category	(colour)	alterations	but	not	with	within-category	(hue)	alterations	(Yang	et	al.,	2016);	similar	results	have	been	reported	in	other	studies	comparing	infants	and	monkeys	(Bornstein	et	al.,	1976),	consistent	with	the	view	expressed	here,	that	constant	colour	categories	are	the	priors	and	that	hues	are	the	posteriors.			Another	posterior	is	provided	by	attaching	colours	to	definite	shapes	or	conditions.	Let	us	take	green	as	a	β	prior.	In	our	culture,	green	is	linguistically	attached	to	a	number	of	objects	and	these,	through	experience,	become	posteriors.	Thus	leaves	are	normally	green,	but	there	could	be	conditions	in	which	they	are	not.	When	the	Fauvists	wanted,	in	their	words,	to	“liberate”	colour	to	give	it	its	maximal	emotional	intensity,	they	simply	attached	unusual	colours	to	common	objects	such	as	trees	or	rivers.	Here	the	new	and	unaccustomed	colour-form	combination	becomes	the	posterior,	with	the	artist	confident	in	the	knowledge	that	the	β	priors	can	be	used	to	generate	such	posteriors.		This	usage	does	not	affect	the	β	priors;	it	simply	changes	the	way	in	which	they	are	used	to	modify	the	posterior.		We	propose	the	following	Bayesian-Laplacian	Brain	Theorem	(see	Appendix	for	mathematical	details),	which	summarizes	the	above	example	theoretically:	the	β	
prior	(e.g.	the	constant	colour	category	generated	from	the	ratio-taking	operation	detailed	above)	generates	a	posterior	of	any	quantity	of	interest	(for	example,	hue	in	the	above	instance).	Let	us	refer	to	this	as	𝐻!!,	where	the	subscript	G	refers	to	the	green	colour	category,	and	the	superscript	0	indicates	that	it	has	an	initial	hue.	The	experiment	conducted	(for	example,	adjusting	the	illuminant	in	a	colour	experiment	or	surrounding	the	green	patch	with	a	patch	of	a	single	colour,	say	red)	will	lead	to	a	posterior	hue	which,	though	still	belonging	to	the	colour	category	of	green,	will	differ	in	its	shade	of	green	(and	hence	hue)	from	𝐻!!.		We	will	refer	to	this	as	𝐻!! .	As	one	experiences	different	shades	of	green	(different	hues)	when	one	view	the	same	scene	in	different	illuminants	or,	in	the	example	of	the	green	patch	above,	changes	its	surrounds,	and	notes	the	
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nature	of	changes	in	the	illuminant	and/or	the	surrounds	of	the	green	patch	being	studied,	so	any	number	of	different	shades	of	green	can	be	generated	and	experienced.	These	posteriors	(𝐻!! ,	where	i	=	0,	1,	2,	…,	can	be	updated	continuously	and	iteratively	in	one’s	life;	knowing	more	about	the	illuminant	or	the	spatial	configuration	of	a	stimulus,	one	can	therefore	make	inferences	with	a	high	degree	of	accuracy	and	reliability.				
III	D.	The	‘belief’	with	respect	to	colours	A	definition	of	‘belief’	might	be	adapted	from	its	ordinary	dictionary	definition,	namely	“a	feeling	of	being	sure	that	someone	or	something	exists	or	that	something	is	true”	(Webster’s	Dictionary),	or	“confidence	in	the	truth	or	existence	of	something	not	immediately	susceptible	to	rigorous	proof	(Dictionary.com)	or	that	“the	experience	(of	colour)	will	always	be	true”,	even	when	we	are	not	remotely	aware	of	the	operations	that	lead	to	the	experience.	The	belief	with	respect	to	colours	is	subtle;	it	consists	of	unconscious	knowledge	and	can	be	illustrated	with	respect	to	the	green	patch	referred	to	above.	Helmholtz	
introduced	the	concept	of	the	“unconscious	inference”	to	account	for	this	but	he	
qualified	it	in	a	way	from	which	we	depart,	for	he	supposed	that	judgment	and	
learning	enter	into	the	“unconscious	inference”.	We	believe	that	the	inference	is	due	
to	an	automatic,	inherited	application	of	a	concept,	that	of	ratio-taking	(but	also	
see	above).	A	viewer	‘knows	unconsciously’	that	the	green	patch	will	look	green	if	it	reflects	more	green	light	than	its	surrounds,	regardless	of	the	actual	amount	of	green	light	reflected	from	it	and	regardless	of	whether	s/he	is	acquainted	with	the	object	or	had	never	seen	it	before,	thus	precluding	judgment	and	learning.	Anyone	armed	with	such	knowledge	can	predict	the	colour	of	a	surface,	even	before	seeing	it.	Thus,	a	red	surface	is	one	that	will	reflect	more	red	light	than	its	surrounds	and	a	blue	surface	is	one	that	will	reflect	more	blue	light	than	its	surrounds.	A	white	surface	will	reflect	more	light	of	all	wavebands	than	its	surrounds	while	a	black	one	will	reflect	less	light	of	all	wavebands	than	its	surrounds,	regardless	of	the	actual	amount	of	light	reflected	from	it.	This	belief	system	is	quite	rigid	and	not	easy	to	manipulate.	Moreover,	any	perceiver	can	make	the	reasonable	assumption	that	the	colour	perceived	under	any	given	conditions	will	be	the	same	for	all,	regardless	of	culture	and	upbringing.			This	can	be	readily	established	by	matching	the	colours	perceived	with	Munsell	chips.	Hence	the	belief	is	universal.	Because	of	this	assumed	universally	shared	belief,	Kant	would	no	doubt	have	referred	to	this	as	an	experience	which	is	not	interfaced	through	a	(prior)	concept.	But,	as	we	have	shown,	it	is	in	this	instance	an	experience	generated	through	an,	the	ratio-taking	operation,	executed	by	the	brain	to	stabilize	the	world	in	terms	of	colour	categories.	We	leave	out	of	account	here	the	vexed	and	unsolved	problem	of	qualia,	of	whether	the	quality	of	green	that	one	person	perceives	is	identical	to	that	perceived	by	another.			It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	that	knowledge	that	a	green	leaf	reflects	more	red	light	(as	is	common	at	dawn	and	dusk)	will	not,	and	cannot,	modify	one’s	experience	of	its	colour	as	green,	provided	that	the	leaf	is	being	viewed	in	a	natural	context	(thus	allowing	the	brain’s	ratio-taking	system	to	operate),	again	calling	into	question	Helmholtz’s	supposition	that	judgment	and	learning	are	
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critical	for	determining	the	colour	category.	In	this	sense,	the	experience	and	the	belief	attached	to	it	are	biologically	constrained.					
IV.	Faces	–	a	category	of	B	priors	
	It	is	generally	agreed	that	there	are	special	areas	of	the	brain	that	are	necessary	for	the	perception	of	faces,	including	an	area	located	in	the	fusiform	gyrus	known	as	the	fusiform	face	area	(FFA)	(Sergent	et	al.,	1992)(Kanwisher	et	al.,	1997)	damage	to	which	leads	to	the	syndrome	of	prosopagnosia.	We	note	that	the	FFA	is	active	when	faces	are	viewed	from	different	angles,	hence	implying	a	certain	degree	of	face	constancy	(Pourtois	et	al.,	2005).	Another	area	critical	for	faces	is	located	in	the	inferior	occipital	cortex	and	known	as	the	occipital	face	area	(OFA)	(Peelen	&	Downing,	2007)(Pitcher,	2014)	while	a	third	area,	located	in	the	superior	temporal	sulcus,	appears	to	be	important	for	the	recognition	of	changing	facial	expressions	(Haxby	et	al.,		2000).	These	may	not	be	the	only	areas	that	are	important	for	face	perception.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	recognition	of	faces	engages	a	much	more	widely	distributed	system	(Ishai	et	al.,	2005);	it	has	also	been	argued	that	cells	responsive	to	common	objects,	in	addition	to	faces,	can	be	found	in	an	area	such	as	FFA.	Whatever	the	merits	of	these	contrasting	views,	they	do	not	much	affect	our	argument,	given	the	heightened	susceptibility	of	faces	to	distortion	and	inversion	and	the	relative	resistance	of	objects	to	similar	treatment	(Zeki	&	Ishizu,	2013,	for	a	review);	this	would	argue	in	favour	of	our	general	supposition	that	𝛽	priors	must	be	separated	from	𝛼	priors,	whether	the	representation	of	objects	and	faces	occurs	in	the	same	or	in	different	brain	areas	(for	a	general	review,	Zeki	&	Ishizu,	2013).			It	is	generally	also	agreed	that	the	capacity	to	recognize	a	certain	“significant	configuration”	(Zeki,	2013)	as	constituting	a	face	is	either	inherited	or	very	rapidly	acquired,	within	hours	after	birth	(Goren	et	al.,	1975)(Johnson	et	al.,	1991),	although	there	has	been	much	discussion	as	to	what	it	is	in	the	configuration	that	is	instantly	recognizable	(see	discussion	in	(Zeki	&	Ishizu,	2013).	It	is	significant	that	this	preference	of	the	new-born	for	looking	at	faces	is	not	found	when	line	drawings	of	real	faces	are	used	(Bushnell	et	al.,	1989)	emphasizing	the	pre-eminence	of	the	biological	concept	of	face.			Any	departures,	even	minor	ones,	from	the	significant	configuration	that	constitutes	the	(possibly)	biologically	inherited	and	accepted	concept	of	a	face	is	rejected	and	never	incorporated	into	the	concept	of	a	normal	face.	The	cortical	response	to	faces	is	itself	very	exigent	in	terms	of	the	significant	configuration	that	it	will	respond	to	optimally;	mis-aligning	the	two	halves	of	an	upright	face	delays	and	increases	the	typical	N170	negative	deflection	obtained	following	facial	stimulation,	but	this	delay	and	increase	are	not	quite	as	strong	for	inverted	faces(Ishizu	et	al.,	2008),	which	are	immediately	classified	as	having	an	abnormal	configuration,	and	thus	not	belonging	to	the	biological	category	of	faces.	It	is,	we	think,	very	difficult	to	produce	a	biologically	viable	posterior,	and	a	belief	attached	to	it,	from	an	inverted	face	(unlike	buildings	–	or	other	artefacts	–	
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see	below)	and,	even	if	produced,	is	unlikely	to	be	durable.	The	same	is	true	of	the	expression	on	a	face,	with	certain	expressions	being	immediately	recognizable	as	comforting	or	loving	and	others	leading	to	different	emotional	apprehensions.	The	posterior	that	results	from	this	β prior	through	experience	is	thus	similarly	circumscribed,	since	any	departure	(as	produced	by	inversions,	for	example)	would	mean	that	the	brain	will	either	not	classify	it	as	a	normal	face,	or	that	it	will	only	be	temporarily	classified	as	a	face,	or	that	it	will	be	classified	as	an	abnormal	face,	without	leaving	a	permanent	posterior.			Any	posterior	generated	from	a	face	β prior	must	therefore	be	strictly	linked	to	what	is	a	normal	significant	configuration	which	constitutes	a	face.	A	child,	for	example,	begins	to	learn	to	associate	certain	expressions	on	a	normal	face	with	certain	social	interactions	–	whether,	for	example,	someone	is	enjoying	one’s	company	or	is	bored	by	it,	whether	small	inflexions	represent	doubts	or	threats,	and	so	on.	But	it	is	unlikely	to	associate	the	expressions	on	an	inverted	face	with	a	permanent	posterior,	since	an	inverted	face	disobeys	the	inherited	brain	concept	of	the	significant	configuration	that	constitutes	a	face.	This	does	not	mean	that	posteriors	related	to	faces	cannot	be	of	an	unusual	nature	–	for	example	a	continual	smile	linked	to	wicked	behaviour	on	the	part	of	an	individual	may	lead	the	perceiver	to	establish	a	different	posterior	from	the	same	β priors	for	that	individual.	But	here	again,	a	perceiver	is	unlikely	to	form	a	permanent	posterior	of	a	smile	linked	to	wickedness	if	the	face	is	mis-aligned	or	inverted.		It	is	interesting	to	note	that,	in	his	effort	to	give	what	he	called	“a	visual	shock”,	the	English	painter	Francis	Bacon	subverted	the	brain’s	β priors	in	terms	of	faces,	and	took	to	painting	highly	deformed	faces,	which	depart	significantly	from	the	significant	configurations	that	constitute	the	normal	β priors	for	faces	(Zeki	&	Ishizu,	2013);	however	prolonged	the	viewing,	these	never	become	accepted	as	normal	faces.	Indeed,	the	viewing	of	stimuli	in	which	inherited	concepts	of	face	(and	space)	are	deformed	and	violated	leads	to	significant	activation	in	frontoparietal	cortex,	whereas	the	viewing	of	“deformed”	or	unusual	configurations	of	common	objects	such	as	cars	do	not.	Even	daily	exposure	to	deformed	faces	and	deformed	objects	for	1	month	does	not	lead	to	a	significant		change	in	activation	patterns	for	both	categories,	suggesting	that	such	biological	concepts	are	stable	at	the	neural	level,	at	least	within	a	time	frame	of	1	month	(Chen	&	Zeki,	2011).	This	neurobiological	demonstration	is	consistent	with	our	proposed	subdivisions	of	priors	into	the	biological	and	artefactual	categories.				
IV	A.	The	‘belief’	attached	to	faces:		We	now	outline	in	general	terms	the	biologically	based	initial	belief	attached	to	normal	faces.	It	is	constrained	by	the	fact	that	a	face	must	contain	a	certain	number	of	features	such	as	eyes,	nose,	mouth	etc,	set	out	within	certain	proportions	and	symmetrical	relations	to	each	other	which,	together,	constitute	a	significant	configuration	typical	of	a	face.	An	absence	of	any	of	these	features	or	any	significant	violation	of	these	proportions	or	relations	will	automatically	depart	from	such	a	belief,	and	lead	to	its	classification	as	abnormal.	There	are	of	course	many	ways	in	which	faces	can	be	represented;	they	can,	for	example,	be	
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represented	in	terms	of	straight	lines	in	a	drawing.	But	such,	though	recognized	as	representing	a	face,	will	be	immediately	classified	as	a	drawing	and	therefore	not	a	biological	face.	This	shows	how	constrained	such	a	belief	and	the	β prior	attached	to	it	is.	In	terms	of	generality,	one	person’s	belief	that	the	object	s/he	is	seeing	is	a	face	and	that	all	others	will	also	perceive	a	face	in	that	configuration	is	a	sound	one	and	makes	that	belief	general.	Just	like	colour,	it	therefore	has	universal	validity.		
V	.	Artefactual	(a)	priors	By	artefactual	priors,	we	refer	to	the	many	constructs	–	from	houses	and	cars	to	ordinary	utensils	and	tools	–	for	which	there	is	no	inherited	brain	concept.	Instead,	the	brain	acquires	a	concept	of	these	objects	through	experience	and	consequent	updating	of	empirical	priors;	these	are	continually	modified	throughout	life.	These	empirical	priors	are	also	strongly	culture	dependent.	In	medieval	times,	people	had	no	concept	of	a	car	or	a	plane.	Since	their	introduction,	there	have	been	many	modifications	of	these	constructs,	and	the	concepts	attached	to	them	have	changed	accordingly.	The	concept	of	a	plane	that	someone	living	in	the	1930s	had,	for	example,	did	not	include	jumbo	jets	equipped	with	jet	engines;	these	have	been	added	to	the	overall	concept	of	a	plane	since.	There	are,	of	course	many	other	examples	one	could	give,	including	the	use	of	knives	and	forks	and	chop-sticks,	which	differ	between	cultures	and	times.	The	formation	of	such	concepts	is	strongly	dependent	on	experience	and	culture,	which	distinguishes	them	from	biologically	inherited	concepts	(see	Figure	2).		Crucially,	acquired	or	empirical	priors	emerge	de	novo	and	are	driven	by	experiences	that	are	unique	to	any	individual	in	any	given	lifetime,	although	there	may	be,	and	usually	are,	population	level	similarities.	They	therefore	are	necessarily	less	precise	and	more	accommodating	than	biological	priors.	This	follows	because	they	are	designed	to	be	modified	by	experience.			It	is	now	generally	accepted	that	there	is	a	complex	of	areas,	known	as	the	lateral	occipital	complex	(LOC)	which	is	critical	for	object	recognition	(Grill-Spector,	2003).	Even	though	it	has	been	argued	that	the	so-called	face	areas	may	not	be	as	specific	to	faces	as	originally	supposed	(see	above),	and	that	cells	in	them	may	encode	objects	as	well,	including	ones	which	we	would	classify	under	artefactual	categories,	the	differential	response	to	faces	and	objects	when	inverted	suggests	that	they	are	processed	differently.	Moreover,	neural	sensitivity	to	faces	increases	with	age	in	face-selective	but	not	object-selective	areas	of	the	brain,	and	the	perceptual	discriminability	of	faces	correlates	with	neural	sensitivity	to	face	identity	in	face	selective	regions,	whereas	it	does	not	correlate	with	a	heightened	amplitude	in	either	face	or	object	selective	areas	(Natu	et	al.,	2016).		There	is	no	definitive	evidence	about	when	infants	begin	to	recognize	objects	or	whether	they	recognize	faces	before	recognizing	objects.	Indeed,	it	has	been	shown	that	infants	can	recognize	differences	between	shapes	even	at	1	month	where	the	outside	contour/shape	is	static	and	identical,	but	where	the	inside	smaller	shapes	are	different	to	each	other	in	each	image	if,	significantly,	one	of	the	smaller	inner	shapes	is	jiggled	or	moved	(Bushnell	et	al.,	1989);	this	may,	in	
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fact,	introduce	a	biological	prior,	that	of	motion,	into	the	recognition	or	inference	process.			Such	results,	together	with	common	experience,	justify	a	neurobiological	separation	between	the	two	categories,	faces	belonging	to	the	biological	category	and	objects	to	the	artefactual.			
VI.	A	biological	prior	that	makes	artefactual	priors	possible?		While	the	emphasis	in	this	article	is	on	separating	biological	from	artefactual	
priors,	it	is	worth	asking	whether,	at	the	earliest	recorded	stages	after	birth,	one	can	postulate	the	presence	of	a	general	biological	prior	that	leads	to	artefactual	priors,	which	then	assume	an	autonomy	of	their	own.	The	common	view	is	that	there	is	one	category	of	cell	in	the	visual	brain,	the	orientation	selective	(OS)	cell,	discovered	by	Hubel	&	Wiesel	(1962),	which	is	the	physiological	‘building	block’	of	all	forms.	This	is	a	plausible	argument	entertained	by	both	physiologists	as	well	as	artists	like	Piet	Mondrian	(	see	Zeki,	1999).	Evidence	from	physiological	and	clinical	studies	of	form	perception	studies	shows	that,	while	the	OS	cells	and	hence	the	machinery	for	constructing	forms	must	be	present	at	birth,	it	requires	nourishment	in	the	early	stages	after	birth	to	mature.	The	most	comprehensive	studies	come	from	the	work	of	Wiesel	and	Hubel,	who	showed	that	OS	cells	are	present	at	birth	but	that	depriving	the	animal	(cat	or	monkey)	at	a	critical	period	after	birth	blights	their	visual	capacities	for	considerable	periods,	perhaps	even	permanently,	thereafter	(Hubel	&	Wiesel,	1977).	Observations	in	humans	deprived	of	vision	at	birth	through	congenital	cataracts,	with	vision	restored	later	in	life	after	successful	operations,	confirms	that	visual	nourishment	during	an	early	‘	critical’	period	is	necessary	for	a	normal	visual	life	(for	a	review,	see	(Zeki,	1993).			By	contrast,	a	normally	nourished	visual	brain	can	subsequently	recognize	and	categorize	many	different	shapes,	even	those	that	have	not	been	seen	before.	Hence,	one	could	consider	that	OS	cells	are	the	given	biological	priors.		In	accepting	the	common	supposition	that	OS	cells	constitute	the	physiological	‘building	blocks’	from	which	all	categories	of	objects	(including	faces)	are	constructed,	one	must	nevertheless	acknowledge	that	(a)	orientation	selective	cells	are	widely	distributed	in	different,	specialized,	visual	areas	of	the	brain	(Zeki,	1978),	and	that	the	OS	cells	of	V1	may	not	be	the	sole	source	for	the	neural	construction	of	objects,	especially	since	OS	cells	in	visual	areas	outside	V1	survive	the	destruction	of	V1	(Schmid	et	al.,	2009),	thus	showing	that	their	properties	are	not	wholly	dependent	upon	input	from	V1.	Thus,	OS	cells	in	different	visual	areas	may	contribute	to	form	construction	in	different	ways.	Moreover,	unlike	what	is	commonly	posited,	V1	is	not	the	sole	source	of	the	‘feed-forward”	visual	input	to	the	rest	of	the	visual	brain;	the	specialized	visual	areas,	including	areas	with	high	concentration	of	OS	cells	as	well	as	areas	specialized	for	face	and	object	perception,	receive	two	further	“feed-forward”	inputs,	from	the	lateral	geniculate	nucleus	and	the	pulvinar	(Zeki,	2016))	and	are	activated	with	the	same	latencies,	post	stimulus	presentation,		as	V1	(Shigihara	&	Zeki,	2013)(Shigihara	&	Zeki,	2014a)(Shigihara	&	Zeki,	2014b).		Hence	a	strictly	hierarchical	organization	for	form	(as	is	commonly	supposed),	in	which	cells	within	the	brain’s	form	system	acquire	increasingly	more	complex	properties,	
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enabling	them	to	respond	to	complex	objects	and	faces	is	probably	unlikely.	Rather,	there	appears	to	be	multiple	hierarchical	systems,	which	operate	in	parallel	and	which	are	task	and	stimulus	dependent	(Zeki,	2016).			There	is	another	difficulty	in	considering	OS	as	being	the	universal	biological	
priors.	One	cannot	build	a	definitive	posterior	from	a	single	or	from	multiple	oriented	lines.	If	faced	with	either,	what	would	the	posterior	be?	This	is	quite	unlike	colour,	where	certain	ratios	of	wavelength	composition	of	light	reflected	from	a	patch	and	from	its	surrounds	determines,	ineluctably,	a	certain	prior	in	the	form	of	a	certain	constant	colour	category,	from	which	posteriors,	in	the	form	of	hues,	can	be	elaborated.	We	are,	we	believe,	therefore	justified	in	supposing	that	orientation	selectivity	cannot	be	a	biological	prior	for	all	forms,	as	most	suppose.	Rather,	OS	cells	in	different	areas	may	be	used	to	construct	different	forms	or	different	categories	of	form,	which	then	act	as	distinct	priors	from	which	posteriors	can	be	generated.	Indeed	a	line	need	not	be	a	means	toward	a	more	complex	form;	it	can	exist	on	its	own,	as	artists	have	so	frequently	demonstrated.	Moreover,	there	is	no	belief	that	can	be	attached	to	single	oriented	lines,	except	in	the	narrow	sense	that	they	can	constitute,	either	singly	or	in	arbitrary	combination,	forms	in	themselves,	as	Alexander	Rodchenko	(1921)	argued	when	he	wrote	“I	introduced	and	proclaimed	the	line	as	an	element	of	construction	and	as	an	independent	form	in	painting”.	He	added,	“…the	line	can	be	expressed	in	its	own	right,	as	the	design	of	a	hypothetical	construction	[and	can	have]	a	status	independent	of	what	is	actually	taking	place,	and	becomes	an	abstraction”	(Rodchenko,	1921)	(our	ellipsis).	Many	artists	since	then	have	emphasized	the	primacy	of	the	line	in	their	work.			Hence,	there	is	no	universal	belief	that	is	attached	to	how	single	oriented	lines	can	be	combined.	There	is	also	no	universal	belief	attached	to	what	significant	configuration	constitutes	a	given	category	of	object.	The	configuration	of	houses,	as	places	of	habitation,	differs	widely	in	different	cultures	–	from	igloos	to	huts	to	skyscrapers	and	even	to	inverted	pyramidal	buildings	(Figure	4).	One	cannot	make	the	assumption	that	huts	are	the	universal	mode	of	habitation	or	that	inverted	buildings	depart	from	the	concept	of	habitation.	Rather,	the	latter	are	absorbed	into	the	concept	(i.e.	generative	models)	of	habitation	through	experience.		
Conclusion:			We	have	here	given	a	general	account	of	what	we	believe	is	an	important	distinction	to	be	made	when	considering	the	brain	as	a	Bayesian-Laplacian	system.	For	simplicity,	we	have	concentrated	on	extreme	examples,	ones	which	we	have	better	knowledge	of;	namely,	that	of	colours	and	faces	for	the	β	priors	and	of	common	artefacts	for	the	α	priors.	This	naturally	leaves	out	of	account	a	vast	territory	in	which	both	priors	may	be	involved.	Laplace	himself	delved	into	questions	of	average	mortality	and	the	average	duration	of	marriages.	The	list	can	be	extended	to	include	social	interactions	as	well	as	economic	activity	in	which	the	unfortunately	un-studied	β	prior	of	greed	may	play	a	crucial	role,	in	addition	to	α	priors.	An	example	of	the	latter,	which	plays	a	role	in	economic	calculations,	is	the	recognition	of	political	decisions	that	influence	monetary	
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values,	which	would	fall	into	the	artefactual,	α,	category.	In	these,	and	many	other	human	activities	that	involve	making	inferences	based	on	a	set	of	beliefs,	the	distinction	between	the	two	categories	of	priors	is,	we	believe,	important.	Finally,	the	distinction	between	biological	and	artefactual	priors	can	also	be	extended	to	aesthetics,	since	aesthetics	pertaining	to	biological	entities	such	as	faces	or	bodies,	are	similarly	constrained	by	the	configurations	that	constitute	them	(Zeki		2009)(Zeki,	2013).			We	have	restricted	ourselves	here	largely	to	the	visual	brain,	but	hope	to	deal	with	other	brain	processes	that	are	subject	to	Bayesian–Laplacian	operations	in	future	papers.			
Acknowledgment:		
	We	are	very	grateful	to	Karl	Friston,	Will	Penny,	and	Stewart	Shipp	for	their	insightful	comments	on	an	earlier	version	of	this	paper.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
References:			Bartels,	A.	&	Zeki,	S.	(2000)	The	architecture	of	the	colour	centre	in	the	human	visual	brain:	new	results	and	a	review.	Eur.	J.	Neurosci.,	12,	172–193.	Bernardo,	J.M.	&	Smith,	A.F.M.	(2008)	Bayesian	Theory,	Bayesian	Theory.	Bornstein,	M.H.,	Kessen,	W.,	&	Weiskopf,	S.	(1976)	The	categories	of	hue	in	infancy.	Science,	191,	201–202.	Botvinick,	M.	&	Toussaint,	M.	(2012)	Planning	as	inference.	Trends	Cogn.	Sci.,.	Bovens,	L.	&	Hartmann,	S.	(2005)	Bayesian	Epistemology,	Bayesian	Epistemology.	Brouwer,	G.J.	&	Heeger,	D.J.	(2013)	Categorical	clustering	of	the	neural	representation	of	color.	J.	Neurosci.,	33,	15454–15465.	Bushnell,	I.W.R.,	Sai,	F.,	&	Mullin,	J.T.	(1989)	Neonatal	recognition	of	the	mother’s	face.	Br.	J.	Dev.	Psychol.,	7,	3–15.	Chen,	C.-H.	&	Zeki,	S.	(2011)	Frontoparietal	activation	distinguishes	face	and	space	from	artifact	concepts.	J.	Cogn.	Neurosci.,	23,	2558–2568.	Clark,	A.	(2013)	Whatever	next?	Predictive	brains,	situated	agents,	and	the	future	of	cognitive	science.	Behav.	BRAIN	Sci.	36,	181–253,	181–253.	Dayan,	P.,	Hinton,	G.E.E.,	Neal,	R.M.M.,	&	Zemel,	R.S.S.	(1995)	The	helmholtz	machine.	Neural	Comput.,	7,	889–904.	Fienberg,	S.E.	(2006)	When	did	Bayesian	inference	become	“Bayesian”?	Bayesian	
Anal.,	1,	1–40.	Friston,	K.,	Mattout,	J.,	&	Kilner,	J.	(2011)	Action	understanding	and	active	inference.	Biol.	Cybern.,	104,	137–160.	Friston,	K.,	Rigoli,	F.,	Ognibene,	D.,	Mathys,	C.,	FitzGerald,	T.,	&	Pezzulo,	G.	(2015)	Active	inference	and	epistemic	value.	Cogn.	Neurosci.,	150217111908007.	Gelman,	A.,	Carlin,	J.B.,	Stern,	H.S.,	&	Rubin,	D.B.	(2004)	Bayesian	Data	Analysis,	Chapman	Texts	in	Statistical	Science	Series.	Gelman,	A.	&	Shalizi,	C.R.	(2013)	Philosophy	and	the	practice	of	Bayesian	statistics.	Br.	J.	Math.	Stat.	Psychol.,	66,	8–38.	Good,	I.J.,	Hacking,	I.,	Jeffrey,	R.C.,	&	Törnebohm,	H.	(1966)	The	Estimation	of	Probabilities:	An	Essay	on	Modern	Bayesian	Methods.	Synthese,	16,	234–244.	Goren,	C.C.,	Sarty,	M.,	&	Wu,	P.Y.	(1975)	Visual	following	and	pattern	discrimination	of	face-like	stimuli	by	newborn	infants.	Pediatrics,	56,	544–549.	Grill-Spector,	K.	(2003)	The	neural	basis	of	object	perception.	Curr.	Opin.	
Neurobiol.,	13,	159–166.	Haxby,	J.,	Hoffman,	E.,	&	Gobbini,	M.	(2000)	The	distributed	human	neural	system	for	face	perception.	Trends	Cogn.	Sci.,	4,	223–233.	Helmholtz,	H.	von	(2001)	Concerning	the	perceptions	in	general.	In	Visual	
Perception:	Essential	Readings.	pp.	24–44.	Hubel,	D.H.	&	Wiesel,	T.N.	(1962)	Receptive	fields,	binocular	interaction	and	functional	architecture	in	the	cat’s	visual	cortex.	J.	Physiol.,	160,	106–154.	Hubel,	D.H.	&	Wiesel,	T.N.	(1977)	Ferrier	lecture.	Functional	architecture	of	macaque	monkey	visual	cortex.	Proc.	R.	Soc.	Lond.	B.	Biol.	Sci.,	198,	1–59.	Ingle,	D.	(1985)	The	goldfish	as	a	retinex	animal.	Science	(80-.	).,	227,	651–654.	Ishai,	A.,	Schmidt,	C.F.,	&	Boesiger,	P.	(2005)	Face	perception	is	mediated	by	a	distributed	cortical	network.	Brain	Res.	Bull.,	67,	87–93.	Ishizu,	T.,	Ayabe,	T.,	&	Kojima,	S.	(2008)	Configurational	factors	in	the	perception	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
of	faces	and	non-facial	objects:	an	ERP	study.	Int.	J.	Neurosci.,	118,	955–966.	Johnson,	M.H.,	Dziurawiec,	S.,	Ellis,	H.,	&	Morton,	J.	(1991)	Newborns’	preferential	tracking	of	face-like	stimuli	and	its	subsequent	decline.	Cognition,	40,	1–19.	Kant,	I.	(1781)	Kritik	Der	Reinen	Vernunft,	1st	Edition,	Translated	by	WS	Pluhar	
(1996)	as	Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	1st	edn.	Hackett,	Indianapolis.	Kant,	I.	(1783)	Prologemena	to	Any	Future	Metaphysics	(Translated	by	PG	Lucas).	Manchester	University	Press,	Manchester.	Kant,	I.	(1787)	Kritik	Der	Reinen	Vernunft,	2nd	Edition,	Translated	as	Critique	of	
Pure	Reason	by	WS	Pluhar.	Hackett,	Indianapolis.	Kanwisher,	N.,	McDermott,	J.,	&	Chun,	M.M.	(1997)	The	fusiform	face	area:	a	module	in	human	extrastriate	cortex	specialized	for	face	perception.	J.	
Neurosci.,	17,	4302–4311.	Kersten,	D.,	Mamassian,	P.,	&	Yuille,	A.	(2004)	Object	Perception	as	Bayesian	Inference.	Annu.	Rev.	Psychol.,	55,	271–304.	Knill,	D.C.	&	Pouget,	A.	(2004)	The	Bayesian	brain:	the	role	of	uncertainty	in	neural	coding	and	computation.	TRENDS	Neurosci.,	27,	712–719.	Lafer-Sousa,	R,	Conway,	BR,	Kanwisheer,	N.	(2016)	Color-biased	regions	of	the	ventral	visual	pathway	lie	between	face-	and	place-selective	regions	in	humans,	as	in	macaques.	J.	Neurosci.,	36,	1682–1697.	Land,	E.	(1974)	The	retinex	theory	of	colour	vision.	Proc.	R.	Inst.	G.	B.,	47,	23–58.	Land,	E.	(1985)	Statement	mad	by	Land	at	a	Stated	Meeting	of	the	American	Academy	of	Arts	&	Sciences.	Stated	Meet.	Rep.,	7–8.	Land,	E.H.	(1986)	An	alternative	technique	for	the	computation	of	the	designator	in	the	retinex	theory	of	color	vision.	Proc.	Natl.	Acad.	Sci.	U.	S.	A.,	83,	3078–3080.	Land,	E.H.	&	McCann,	J.J.	(1971)	Lightness	and	Retinex	Theory.	J.	Opt.	Soc.	Am.,	
61,	1–11.	Lee,	T.S.	&	Mumford,	D.	(2003)	Hierarchical	Bayesian	inference	in	the	visual	cortex.	J.	Opt.	Soc.	Am.	A.	Opt.	Image	Sci.	Vis.,	20,	1434–1448.	marquis	de	Laplace,	P.S.	(1812)	Théorie	Analytique	Des	Probabilités.	V.	Courcier.	Meadows,	J.C.	(1974)	Disturbed	perception	of	colours	associated	with	localized	cerebral	lesions.	Brain,	97,	615–632.	Natu,	V.S.,	Barnett,	M.A.,	Hartley,	J.,	Gomez,	J.,	Stigliani,	A.,	&	Grill-Spector,	K.	(2016)	Development	of	Neural	Sensitivity	to	Face	Identity	Correlates	with	Perceptual	Discriminability.	J.	Neurosci.,	36,	10893–10907.	Peelen,	M.	V	&	Downing,	P.E.	(2007)	The	neural	basis	of	visual	body	perception.	
Nat.	Rev.	Neurosci.,	8,	636–648.	Pitcher,	D.	(2014)	Facial	Expression	Recognition	Takes	Longer	in	the	Posterior	Superior	Temporal	Sulcus	than	in	the	Occipital	Face	Area.	J.	Neurosci.,	34,	9173–9177.	Pouget,	A.,	Beck,	J.M.,	Ma,	W.J.,	&	Latham,	P.E.	(2013)	Probabilistic	brains:	knowns	and	unknowns.	Nat.	Neurosci.,	16,	1170–1178.	Pourtois,	G.,	Schwartz,	S.,	Seghier,	M.L.,	Lazeyras,	F.,	&	Vuilleumier,	P.	(2005)	View-independent	coding	of	face	identity	in	frontal	and	temporal	cortices	is	modulated	by	familiarity:	An	event-related	fMRI	study.	Neuroimage,	24,	1214–1224.	Rao,	R.P.N.	&	Ballard,	D.H.	(1999)	Predictive	coding	in	the	visual	cortex:	a	functional	interpretation	of	some	extra-classical	receptive-field	effects.	Nat.	
Neurosci.,	2,	79–87.	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
Rosenkrantz,	R.D.	(1977)	Inference,	Method	and	Decision:	Towards	a	Bayesian	
Philosophy	of	Science.	D.	Reidel	Publishing	Company.	Schmid,	M.C.,	Panagiotaropoulos,	T.,	Augath,	M.A.,	Logothetis,	N.K.,	&	Smirnakis,	S.M.	(2009)	Visually	driven	activation	in	macaque	areas	V2	and	V3	without	input	from	the	primary	visual	cortex.	PLoS	One,	4,	e5527.	Sergent,	J.,	Ohta,	S.,	&	MacDonald,	B.	(1992)	Functional	neuroanatomy	of	face	and	object	processing.	A	positron	emission	tomography	study.	Brain,	115,	15–36.	Shigihara,	Y.	&	Zeki,	S.	(2013)	Parallelism	in	the	brain’s	visual	form	system.	Eur.	J.	
Neurosci.,	38,	3712–3720.	Shigihara,	Y.	&	Zeki,	S.	(2014a)	Parallel	processing	in	the	brain’s	visual	form	system:	an	fMRI	study.	Front.	Hum.	Neurosci.,	8,	506	doi:	10.3389/fnhum.2014.00506.	Shigihara,	Y.	&	Zeki,	S.	(2014b)	Parallel	processing	of	face	and	house	stimuli	by	V1	and	specialized	visual	areas:	a	magnetoencephalographic	(MEG)	study.	
Front.	Hum.	Neurosci.,	8,	901:doi:	10.3389/fnhum.2014.00901.	Stoughton,	C.M.	&	Conway,	B.R.	(2008)	Neural	basis	for	unique	hues.	Curr.	Biol.,	
18,	R698-9.	Talbott,	W.	(2008)	Bayesian	Epistemology.	Stanford	Encycl.	Philos.,.	Yang,	J.,	Kanazawa,	S.,	Yamaguchi,	M.K.,	&	Kuriki,	I.	(2016)	Cortical	response	to	categorical	color	perception	in	infants	investigated	by	near-infrared	spectroscopy.	Proc.	Natl.	Acad.	Sci.	U.	S.	A.,	113,	2370–2375.	Yuille,	A.	&	Kersten,	D.	(2006)	Vision	as	Bayesian	inference:	analysis	by	synthesis?	Trends	Cogn.	Sci.,	10,	301–308.	Zeki,	S.	(1973)	Colour	coding	in	rhesus	monkey	prestriate	cortex.	Brain	Res.,	53,	422–427.	Zeki,	S.	(1978)	Uniformity	and	diversity	of	structure	and	function	in	rhesus	monkey	prestriate	visual	cortex.	J.	Physiol.,	277,	273–290.	Zeki,	S.	(1980)	The	representation	of	colours	in	the	cerebral	cortex.	Nature,	284,	412–418.	Zeki,	S.	(1983)	The	distribution	of	wavelength	and	orientation	selective	cells	in	different	areas	of	monkey	visual	cortex.	Proc.	R.	Soc.	London	B,	217,	449–470.	Zeki,	S.	(1984)	The	construction	of	colours	by	the	cerebral	cortex.	Proc.	R.	Inst.	G.	
B.,	56,	231–257.	Zeki,	S.	(1990)	A	century	of	cerebral	achromatopsia.	Brain,	113,	1721–1777.	Zeki,	S.	(1993)	A	Vision	of	the	Brain.	Blackwell	Scientific,	Oxford.	Zeki,	S.	(1999)	Inner	Vision:	An	Exploration	of	Art	and	the	Brain.,	Optometry	and	Vision	Science.	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford.	Zeki,	S.	(2009)	Splendors	and	Miseries	of	the	Brain:	Love,	Creativity	and	the	Quest	
for	Human	Happiness.	Wiley-Blackwell,	Oxford.	Zeki,	S.	(2013)	Clive	Bell’s	“Significant	Form”	and	the	neurobiology	of	aesthetics.	
Front.	Hum.	Neurosci.,	7,	730.	Zeki,	S.	(2016)	Multiple	asynchronous	dtimulus-	and	task-dependent	hierarchies	(STDH)	within	the	brain’s	parallel	processing	systems.	Eur.	J.	Neurosci.,.	Zeki,	S.	&	Ishizu,	T.	(2013)	The	“Visual	Shock”	of	Francis	Bacon:	an	essay	in	neuroesthetics.	Front.	Hum.	Neurosci.,	7,	850.	Zeki,	S.,	Watson,	J.,	&	Lueck,	C.	(1991)	A	direct	demonstration	of	functional	specialization	in	human	visual	cortex.	J.	Neurosci.,.	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
Zeki,	S.,	Watson,	J.D.,	Lueck,	C.J.,	Friston,	K.J.,	Kennard,	C.,	&	Frackowiak,	R.S.	(1991)	A	direct	demonstration	of	functional	specialization	in	human	visual	cortex.	J.	Neurosci.,	11,	641–649.		 																																													
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
Supplementary	Materials	
	
Part	I:			Let	ℭ	be	the	posterior	of	C	(colour	category),	ℌ		the	posterior	of	H	(hue),	𝛽! 	and	𝛽! 	the	β	priors	for	C	and	H,	and	𝜀	depends	on	the	experiment	conducted.	The	following	three	steps	constitute	the	theorem.			
Step	I	(Biological	𝛽	prior):	inherited	or	rapidly	acquired	very	shortly	after	birth,	a	𝛽	prior	is	neurobiologically	immutable;	it	is	constant	throughout	one’s	life	span,	and	is	almost	totally	resistant	to	culture	and	learning.	Notationally,	we	can	say	that	the	posterior	for	colour,	ℭ,	is	deterministic	of	the	𝛽	prior	for	the	colour	category,	𝛽! ,	or		 𝕮	← 𝜷𝑪																									(	1	)		Step	2	(Initialization):	Immediately	after	birth,	the	𝛽	prior	is	incorporated	with	the	first	scene	(𝜺𝟎)	viewed	along	with	a	prior	(derived	from	viewing	a	new	scene	containing	a	hue);	next,	the	illuminants	are	adjusted	so	that	the	green	patch	is	reflecting	more	red	light	and	the	shade	of	green	changes	to	a	darker	green	which	becomes	the	initial	posterior	ℌ!.	Notationally,	we	say	the	initial	posterior	for	hue,	𝕳𝟎,	is	dependent	upon	𝛽	prior	𝛽! 	for	hue	and	the	first	experiment	conducted	𝜺𝟎,	or		 						𝕳𝟎 ∝  𝜺𝟎 𝜷𝟎𝑯             (	2	)		Step	3	(Adaptive	Learning):	The	illuminants	are	re-adjusted	(the	same	scene	is	viewed	in	a	different	illuminant)	so	that	the	green	patch	is	now	reflecting	more	green	light.	Now	its	hue	changes	to	a	much	brighter	green.	The	posterior	formed	in	Step	2	then	becomes	a	new	(now	more	informative)	𝛽 prior	of	hue	(call	it	𝛽!!)	and	along	with	a	new	scene	(𝜺𝟏),	forms	a	new	posterior	of	hue	𝕳𝟏.	This	process	continues	throughout	the	entire	life	span:	whenever	new	experiments	occur,	old	posteriors	become	the	new	priors,	and	together	they	form	the	new	posteriors,	Notationally,	for	the	𝑛!!	iteration:							
									𝕳𝒏  ∝  𝜺𝒏 𝜷𝒏𝑯																				(	2	)		The	procedure	is	illustrated	in	Figure	3	below	
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					 																							(a)	Initialization																																															(b)	Iterative	update		Figure	3:	The	Bayesian	brain	procedures				(a)	once	an	experiment	is	conducted	(for	example	by	viewing	a	patch	of	colour	in	different	illuminants),	the	brain	incorporates	the	experimental	data	𝜀	and	the	prior	regarding	a	quantity	of	interest	(e.g.	hue)	and	thus	forms	the	posterior	for	that	quantity.	In	the	absence	of	any	prior	regarding	that	quantity	(e.g.	when	the	observer	has	never	seen	a	dark	green	hue	before	the	experiment),	the	brain	naturally	assigns	a	non-informative	prior	(e.g.	a	flat	prior	𝛽!!);	if	the	observer	had		experienced	that	hue	before	the	experiment,	the	brain	assigns	an	informative	prior	(e.g.	a	Gaussian	density	with	high	probability	around	dark	green,	or	𝛽!!);	(b)	once	the	posterior	(e.g.	𝐻!)	is	formed,	it	then	(possibly	instantaneously)	becomes	the	new	prior	(i.e.	𝛽!!),	that,	together	with	a	new	experiment	(e.g.	𝜀!),	forms	a	new	posterior	(𝐻!).	This	process	continues	throughout	one’s	life.		
															 																							(a)	Initialization																																															(b)	Iterative	update		Figure	4:	An	Example	of	the	Bayesian	Brain	Procedures	in	Viewing	Houses.		(a)	at	the	top,	a	simple	house	is	viewed	(e.g.	𝜀!).	In	the	absence	of	any	prior	regarding	houses,	a	noinformative	
prior	(e.g.	a	flat	prior	𝛽!!)	is	incorporated,	resulting	in	an	initial	posterior.	Note	that	this	𝛽!! ,	despite	being	noninformative,	is	dependent	upon	the	brain’s	biological	prior,	for	example,	for	angles	and	lines.	Once	a		posterior	(e.g.	𝐻!)	is	formed,	it	then	(possibly	instantaneously)	becomes	the	new	prior	for	houses	(i.e.	𝛽!!),	that,	together	with	viewing	a	new	house	(now	the	Empire	State	Building,	e.g.	𝜀!),	forms	a	new	posterior	for	houses	(𝐻!).	(b)	This	process	continues	throughout	one’s	life.	When	a	church	(e.g.	𝜀!!!)	is	viewed,	one	incorporates	priors	for	houses	and	for	a	cross	(e.g.	𝛽!!!! 	above),	and	forms	a	new	posterior	for	houses(𝐻!!!).		Similarly,	when	an	lgloo	(e.g.	𝜀!)	is	viewed,	one	incorporates	priors	for	houses	and	for	snow	(e.g.	𝛽!!	above),	and	forms	a	new	posterior	for	houses	(𝐻!).	In	general,	the	order	of	which	houses	are	viewed	does	not	matter	as	much	in	forming	posteriors.	Yet,	throughout	our	life,	we	tend	to	encounter	close	to	our	culture	first,	then	extend	to	complex	houses	and	houses	of	exotic	cultures.	The	above	figure	summarizes	such	an	experience.						
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Part	II	
		Proof	of	Equations	(1)	and	(2):		For	simplicity,	let	us	prove	Equations	(1)	and	(2)	in	the	context	of	colour	vision.			First,	let	us	define	H,	C,	E	as	hue,	colour	category,	and	the	experiment	conducted	(where	we	change	O	and	S,	wavelength	composition	from	the	centre,	and	wavelength	composition	from	the	surrounds,	respectively).		Let	us	further	define	
R	as	the	ratio	in	the	amount	of	light	of	different	wavebands	reflected	from	the	centre	and	from	the	surrounds	(hereinafter	ratio).		Given	0,	S,	the	ratio	R	that	forms	colour	category	is	fixed:		 𝑹 ≡ 𝑶/𝑺  5.		By	Bayes’	rule,	we	have		 [C|E,	R]	∝ 𝑬 𝑪,𝑹 𝑪 𝑹 𝑹 ∝ 𝑹 	
	where	the	second	∝	follows	from:	since	C	is	deterministic	of	R,	then	ℙ(C|R)	is	either	1	or	0,	and	that	C	and	R	are	independent	of	E.	Denoting	[C|E,	R]	as	the	posterior	ℭ	for	colour	category	and	 𝑅 	as	the	𝛽 prior	𝛽! 	for	colour	category,	we	have	proven	equation	(1).		Next,			 𝑯 𝑪,𝑬,𝑹  ∝  [𝑬|𝑯,𝑪,𝑹] 𝑯 𝑪,𝑹 𝑹 𝑪 𝑪 ∝ [𝑬|𝑯][𝑯|𝑪,𝑹][𝑹]											where	the second ∝ 	follows	from:	C	and	R	are	independent	of	E,	P(C|R)	is	either	1	or	0,	and	C	is	deterministic	of	R.	Denoting	[H|C,	E,	R]	as	the	posterior	ℌ	for	hue,	[𝑯|𝑪,𝑹][𝑹]	as	the	𝛽 prior 𝛽!  for	hue,	and	[𝐸|𝐻]	as	𝜀 the	experiment	conducted,	we	have	ℌ ∝ 𝜀 𝛽! ,	which	proves	equation	(2).		Remarks:		Note	that	the	𝛽	prior	𝛽! 	for	hue	constitutes	two	parts	 𝑯 𝑪,𝑹 	an	informative	prior	for	hue,	and	 𝑹 ,	the	𝛽 prior	𝛽! 	for	colour	category.									 																																																												5	Here,	O	and	S	are	both	three-dimensional.	For	example,	0	=	(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	)		and	S	=	(𝑔!! ,	𝑔!! ,	and	𝑔!! 	).	See	Section	III	B	of	the	article	for	further	details.	
.CC-BY-ND 4.0 International licensenot peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/094516doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Dec. 15, 2016; 
